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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
logically have accepted the reasonable grounds test for arrest,
thereby validating the revocation.' In refusing to do so, the
implied consent statute has been rendered useless as an
instrument for the promotion of highway safety, and the
legislature is left to cure what this court could have prevented.
LELAND HAGEN
MENTAL HEALTH-CARE AND SUPPORT OF DISORDERED
PERSONS-LIABILITY OF RELATIVES-EQUAL PROTECTION-The
California Department of Mental Hygiene, pursuant to
statute,' presented a claim to intestate's estate for the
support of intestate's mother who was an inmate in a mental
institution. Defendant administratrix disallowed the claim
and appealed from an adverse judgement in Superior court.
The Supreme Court held that a statute which imposes upon
one adult, because of a family relationship, a duty to support
another adult, who is confined in a mental institution, is
arbitrary and unreasonable and thus violates the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Department
of Mental Hygiene v Kirchner, 36 Cal. Rpts. 488, 388 P.2d 720.
At common law the state undertook the care and custody
of idiots and lunatics and of their estates. 2 There was no
duty upon parents to support their adult children3 or upon
children to support their parents.4 Nor was there a duty
upon a wife to support her husband. 5  The first statute
appearing in this area was 43 Eliz. C.2 § 7 (1601)
A large majority of the states have statutes which are
comparable to the California statute involved in the principal
19. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-06-15. "Arrest without a warrant.-A
peace officer, without a warrant, may arrest a person. 1. For a public offense,
committed or attempted in his presence " with Smith V. Hubbard, 253 Minn.
215, 91 N.W.2d 756 (1958), wherein the court adopted the reasonable grounds
test even though the arrest statute is the same as North Dakota's.
1. CAL. WELFARE AND INST'NS. CODE ANN. § 6650 (West 1956) "The hus-
band, wife, father, mother or children of a mentally ill person or inebriate
shall be liable for his care, support and maintenance in a state institution of
-which he is an inmate.
2. 2 ODGERS, COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND, 1381 (2d Ed. 1920).
3. Murrah v. Bailes, 255 Ala. 178, 50 So. 2d 735 (1951).
4. Duffy v. Yordi, 149 Cal. 140, 84 Pac. 838 (1906).
5. Hagert v. Hagert, 22 N.D. 290, 133 N.W 1035 (1911).
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case. 6 These statutes have withstood attacks on various
grounds: due process, 7 class legislation," invalid taxation, 9
and equal protection."0 Some states, however, have required
that their statutes be strictly construed." The principal case
appears to be the first under these support laws to consider
whether "equal protection" forbids the imposition of any
statutory duty upon individuals, as opposed to the general
public, to support their insane "relatives"
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not preclude the states from creating reasonable classes
for purposes of legislation. 2  All that is required is that the
classification be not arbitrary but based on a real and sub-
stantial difference having a reasonable relation to the subject
of the particular legislation.1
3
Considering the validity of "poor laws",14  which are
closely analagous to the statutes in question,15 courts have
held that the difference upon which the classification is based
is a natural one, embracing the strong moral obligation to
care for the unfortunate members of one's own family 16
Their rationale has been that since the general purposes of
"poor laws" are the relief of the poor 17 and the protection
6. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5121.06 (Baldwin supp. 1957) NEs. REV.
STAT. § 83-352 (1943). Some states get the same effect as the California statute
by incorporating their "poor laws" into their mental health laws, e.g., Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 7357 (poor law), 6909-13 (mental health). A few states have no
analagous statutes: Arizona, Missouri, New Mexico, Florida, Oklahoma, Hawaii
(9).
7. Beach v. Government of District of Columbia, 320 F.2d 790 (D.C. Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 84 S. Ct. 351 (2) (1963).
8. In Re Ideman's Commitment, 146 Ore. 13, 27 P.2d 305 (1933)
9. Kough v. Hoehlec, 413 Ill. 409, 109 N.E.2d 177 (1956) held that the
charge imposed was not a tax, cf. McKenna v. Roberts County, 72 S.D. 250, 32
N.W.2d 687 (1948).
10. Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. McGilvey, 50 Cal. Rptr. 742, 329 P.2d 689
(1958). There the question was whether it was a denial of equal protection to
hold "relatives" primarily liable in cases of mental inmates and only secondarily
liable in cases involving other institutions. In Kough v. Hoehler, supra note 9, the
question was whether the state could create liability in cases of civil commit-
ments without also creating it in cases of criminal commitments.
11. E.g., In Re Boles Estate, 316 Pa. 179, 173 A. 664 (1934) In Re Mangan's
Will, 83 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1948).
12. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 720 (1963).
13. Power Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490 (1927).
14. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 23-2302 (1935) "The father, mother, or child of
any pauper if sufficiently able, shall support such pauper."
15. See notes 1, 6, 14, supra. See note 20, infra.
16. People v. Hill, 163 Ill. 186, 46 N.E. 796 (1896). The statute under attack
provided, "that every poor person who shall be unable to earn a livelihood in
consequence of any bodily infirmity, idiocy, lunacy or other unavoidable cause,
shall be supported by the father, grandfather, mother, grandmother, children,
grandchildren, brothers or sisters of such poor person" ILL. REV. STAT. C. 107
§ 1 (1895).
17. E.g., State Bd. of Child Welfare v. P.G.F., 57 N.J.S. 370, 154 A.2d 764
(1959).
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of the public purse,"8 the existence of a family relationship
provides an adequate basis for relieving the general public of
the duty to support these persons, and for placing the burden
upon those naturally and morally obligated to carry it.'
It would appear that similar logic is applicable where
"relatives" are required to support insane persons. 20
The United States Supreme Court has said that the
presumption of constitutionality of a statute should be over-
come only by the most explicit demonstration that the
classification is unreasonable and arbitrary;21 that the burden
should be upon the one attacking the legislation to negative
every conceivable basis which might support it.
2
North Dakota follows the majority of the states in
requiring that "relatives" of an insane person may be held
liable for the support of that person while he is an inmate
in a mental institution. 2 3  Like most states, North Dakota
also has a "poor law" 24 There appears to be no case law
having a significant bearing on the question under discussion. 25
It would seem that this subject is one for determination
by the legislatures, not the courts. For the courts to say
that a family relationship with its natural moral obligations
does not provide a rational basis for classification appears
inconsistent with the prevailing view that state statutes in
equal protection cases should be interpreted, insofar as
18. E.g., In Re Cook, 22 Misc. 479, 198 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1960).
19. See People v. Hill, supra note 16 Mallatt v. Luihn, 206 Ore. 678, 294
P.2d 871 (1956)). Wells V. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 44 S.E.2d 31 (1947) held, with-
out relying on any statute, that a father is morally and legally obligated to
support his adult son who is a pauper by reason of a mental deficiency
20. Cf., Beach v. Government of District of Columbia, supra note 7, wherein
the court held valid a District of Columbia statute, D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-318
(1951), which is similar to the California statute in question. The Court relied
heavily on People v. Hill, supra note 16 in holding the statute was not unreason-
able. Although the attack was made on due process grounds the holding is
germane because the legislative power over the District of Columbia is analagous
to the police power of the states. Lansburg v. District of Columbia, 11 App.
C.C. 512 (1897). In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) it was said that in
many cases the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment has the same effect
upon congressional power over the District of Columbia as the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has upon the states. Accord, e.g., State v.
Bateman, 110 Kan. 546, 204 Pac. 682 (1922) In Re Idleman's Commitment,
supra note 8 State v. Webber, 163 Ohio St. 598, 128 N.E.2d 3 (1955).
21. Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
22. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
23. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-09-04 (Supp. 1963) " 'responsible relative' shall
mean the patient's spouse, father, mother or children." Under a prior statute,
North Dakota allowed the counties to seek reimbursement from "relatives" N.D.
CENT. CODE § 25-08-26 (1960).
24. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 50-01-19, 50-01-20 (1960).
25. But ef. Bismarck Hospital v. Harris, 68 N.D. 374, 280 N.W 423 (1938).
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possible, to be predicated upon legitimate legislative
considerations.
LYNN CROOKS
COURTS-OVERRULING OF PREVIOUS DECISION-E F F E C T-
Plaintiff sued to cancel a conditional sales contract and
promissory note made in 1960 for the purchase of a house
trailer The contract was made in compliance with the
Nebraska Installment Sales Act' in effect at that time.
(Before this suit was instituted the "Sales Act" was declared
unconstitutional by the Elder v Doerr2 decision.) The
Nebraska Supreme Court held that the finance charges,
computed in the sales contract, were in excess of the interest
allowable by the Nebraska Istallment Loan Act.3 Therefore,
they canceled the contract and note, ordered the defendant
to return the payments which he had received under the
contract and also to deliver an unencumbered title for the
trailer to the plaintiff. Two Justices, in separate concurring
opinions, said that since this was a new rule of law conflicting
with previous opinions of this court, and since a great number
of important financial transactions had been consummated
relying on the past decisions, this decision should be applied
only prospectively Lloyd v Gutgsell, 175 Neb. 775, 124 N.W
2d 198 (1963)
A judicial decision is generally thought not to make law
but to declare law as it always existed. 4 Under this view
a decision is necessarily applied retroactively, and declares
that prior inconsistent holdings never were the law,' We
can readily see that this "declaratory" concept of law can
produce serious hardship when contract rights, acquired in
reliance on the prior decision, are interfered with by the
new decision.
6
1. Neb. R. B. S. § 45-301 to 312 (1960).
2. 175 Neb. 483, 122 N.W.2d 528 (1963).
3. Neb. R. R. S. § 45-114 to 158 (1960).
4. Ross v. Board of Freeholders, 90 N.J.L. 522, 102 Atl. 397 (1917) Landers
v. Tracy 171 Ky 657, 188 SW 763 (1916) Falconer v. Simmons, 51 WVa. 172,
41 S.E. 193 (1902).
5. Legg's Estate v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1940) Center
School Township v. State, 150 Ind. 168, 49 N.E. 961 (1898).
6. The instant case is an example of a contract made on what was thought
to be the law prior to the Elder v. Doerr decision, supra note 2. The seller is
